

Attitude Toward Khilafah Establishment: Causal Model of Muslim Fundamentalist Groups in Indonesia

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Abstract: Some Islamic groups think that Islam should be the foundation of the state, and that the system/form of state compatible with Islam is khilafah (an Islamic state encompassing the whole world) and enforcing sharia (Islamic laws) as the constitution. This study aims to test theoretical model about attitude toward khilafah establishment (political attitude) in three Islamic fundamentalist groups. Based on social identity theory, system justification theory and social cognitive motivation approach, this study tries to understand how psychological needs (thee need of uncertainty avoidance and the need of threat management), Islamic ideologies (salafi ideology and daula Islam ideology), and group identification influence attitude toward khilafah establishment and sharia enforcement. Analyses of data from 384 members of JAT (Jamaah Anshoru Tauhid), MMI (Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia) who participated in the research showed a fit in each group between the proposed model and data. Each group showed variability in strength of structural relationship between variables. Results of this study give theoretical and empirical implications about political attitudes of some Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia.

Keywords: *need of uncertainty avoidance, need of threat management, salafi ideology, daula Islam ideology, in-group identification, political attitude*

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the preparation of independence, Muslim communities in Indonesia had different political views about the nation-state form and democracy. The majority of Muslims in Indonesia are moderate Muslims, who do not see Islam and democracy as a contradiction, so they accept and support democracy (Ashour, 2009; Effendy, 1998; Madrid, 2001; Mujani, 2003). Whereas some other Muslims, like in HTI (*Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia*), MMI (*Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia*) and JAT (*Jamaah Anshoru Tauhid*) groups, think that the state and democracy are contradicting Islamic beliefs (Effendy, 1998; Sheridan, 2006), so that the establishment of *khilafah* and *sharia* laws enforcement as the state constitution must be fought for. Muslim groups who refuse democracy and fight for *khilafa-sharia* are widely known in Indonesia as political Islam, which conceptualize Islam not just as a religion but also a political ideology. For more than four decades, the government – both in the Old Order and the New Order regime - had been trying to tame and weaken these groups; 1977 and 1978 were the year of confrontation between them and the military government of President Soeharto.

At the end of the New Order, various political Islamic movements that did not have room to grow during the Old Order and New Order regime started to appear (Hasan, 2008). Their aim was to establish an Islamic sociopolitical system (Moaddel, 2008), by applying and enforcing *sharia* in all aspects of life (Zada, 2003), therefore they wanted to change the nation-state and democracy system that were applied in Indonesia. Understanding this *khilafa-sharia* movement is crucial, because it often turns into problem when its supporters show intolerant behavior (An-Naim, 2003), treason and terrorism (Ben Ali, 2006; Kramer, 2003; Rapoport, 1998). For example the groups FPI (*Front Pembela Islam* or Islamic Defenders Front) and MMI who conducted raids to places with prostitution, gambling and alcoholic drinks (Purnomo, 2004), and *Lasykar Jihad*'s involvement in religious conflicts in Ambon, Maluku. Some JAT members were even involved in suicide bombing in Mapolresta Cirebon Complex, West Java, on 15 April 2011; suicide bombing in *Bethel Injil Sepenuh Church* in Kepunton, Solo, on 25 September 2011; bombing in Senolo village, Bima, West Nusa Tenggara on 11 July 2011; and even until now, Abu Bakar Baasyir (JAT's leader) is still in Nusakambangan Prison because of military training of a terrorism group in Aceh (Kompas.com, retrieved 2011).

This study is important for social psychology, to investigate the power of psychology behind the political attitudes and behavior of society (see Jost et al., 2003a). This study is a theoretical and empirical effort in criticizing political psychology theory about political attitude, to understand and explain the motives of political Islamic groups who want to change the democracy in Indonesia to *khilafa-sharia* system, taking into account some psychological aspects like needs, ideology and group psychology.

System justification theory (Jost et al., 2004; Jost & Hunyady, 2005), explains that political attitude of an individual or group who supports or is against the status quo (prevailing socio-political system), is related to

the core dimension of conservative political ideology which refuses change, while the core dimension of liberal political ideology is to encourage change. According to this theory, individual or group with conservative political ideology supports the status quo; whereas individual or group with liberal political ideology wants to change the status quo. Furthermore, Jost et al. (2008) stated that the motives of individuals and groups with conservative ideology in maintaining the prevailing social system are caused by the need of uncertainty avoidance and the need of threat management. The conservative political ideology will help individuals and groups in reducing uncertainty, fear, anxiety and feelings of being threatened (Jost et al., 2003b).

These two psychological needs, of uncertainty avoidance and threat management, even drive individuals or groups to rationalize economic and social inequality, and justify the system and existing social strata (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Jost et al., 2008, Thorisdottir et al., 2009). But system justification theory cannot explain why extreme right-wing movement with conservative ideology, like *khilafa-sharia* establishment movement in Indonesia, wants to change democracy (the status quo) instead.

Previous research (Chusniyah, 2012) revealed that the political attitude of Islamic groups to establish *khilafa-sharia* was not because of political ideology (liberal-conservative), as stated by Jost's system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1998), but it was influenced by religious ideology (Ben Ali, 2006; Golose, 2010; Ramakrishna, 2009; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Muluk et al., 2010; Unger, 2007), that is, *salafi* (the belief to purify religion and practice Islam like the *salaf* (the original teachings in the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the *salaf*) and *daula* Islam ideology (the belief to establish Islamic state), driven by the need to avoid uncertainty and to manage threat (Jost, 2006; Jost et al., 2003; Thorisdottir et al., 2009), and commitment to these ideologies influenced identification levels to ingroup.

Salafi ideology appears because of Islamic groups' need of uncertainty avoidance that raises categorical views (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1947), which divide the world into two: muslims and infidels. This psychological need drives individuals to purify Islam and believe that muslims have to go back to the original teachings in the era of the Prophet Muhammad and the *salaf* (Esposito & Voll, 2001; Frey, 2007; Sageman, 2004). The stronger the need of uncertainty avoidance in Islamic groups, the stronger the commitment to salafi ideology.

The state of the world today is also considered a threat to the original teachings of Prophet Muhammad (Sageman, 2004). The need of threat management in Islamic groups drives them to maintain and protect their religious belief as a reaction to changes in society at this time (Frey, 2007). The changing condition of the world today is seen as a threat to religious values, and this condition can only be fixed by *daula* Islam (Akbar, 2002). The need of threat management drives Islamic groups to hold on to *daula* Islam ideology. Therefore, every muslim has the obligation to participate in building an Islamic state and society (Esposito & Voll, 2001), and to achieve this goal they seek political power (An-Naim, 2004). The stronger the need of threat management in Islamic groups, the stronger the commitment to *daula* Islam ideology.

In psychology, ideology is defined as an organization of opinions, attitudes, values, beliefs, way of thinking about man and society (Adorno, 1950), institutionalized or shared with others, deriving from external authority and internalized in groups (Rokeach, 1968), aiming to unify thoughts and actions of the members (Kerlinger, 1984). *Daula* Islam ideology is used by the leaders to build the group, so that the actions of its members can be regulated in order to achieve the goal in changing democracy and establish *khilafa-sharia* in Indonesia (Almond et al., 2003). Belief and commitment of the members to *daula* Islam ideology is spread intensively in the group (Sageman, 2004; Ramleth, 2001). This intense collective identification will build commitment to group, integrity, and cohesiveness to ideology. *Daula* Islam ideology is a group characteristic that's dispersed collectively, to facilitate the development of social identity and develop a strong attachment to internal group (Lane, 1999). Therefore, the stronger the commitment of group members to *daula* Islam ideology, the stronger the attachment to the group.

II. METHOD

This is a non-experimental study using survey to members of groups supporting the idea of *khilafa-sharia* establishment, that is, MMI, JAT, and HTI.

2.1. Research Questions

This study is a follow-up research that aims to answer these questions:

- 2.1.1. Is there a fit between research data in each group (HTI, JAT and MMI) and theoretical model of need of uncertainty avoidance, need of threat management, *salafi* ideology, *daula* Islam ideology, and group identification in influencing attitude of *khilafa-sharia* establishment?
- 2.1.2. How big is the influence of the need of uncertainty avoidance, need of threat management, *salafi* ideology, *daula* Islam ideology, and group identification on the attitude of *khilafa-sharia* establishment in each group (HTI, JAT and MMI)?

2.2. Hypothesis For Each Group: HTI, JAT, and MMI

Structural model hypothesis (major hypothesis) that will be tested in this study is the attitude of *khilafa-sharia* influenced by the need of uncertainty avoidance, the need of threat management, *salafi* ideology, *daula* Islam ideology, and group identification in HTI, JAT, and MMI. While the structural relationships between research variables (minor hypothesis) are hypothesized as follows: H1-The higher the need of uncertainty avoidance, the higher *salafi* ideology in individuals. H2-The higher the need of threat management, the higher *daula* Islam ideology in individuals. H3-The higher the *salafi* ideology, the higher *daula* Islam ideology in individuals. H4-The higher *daula* Islam ideology, the higher group identification levels. H5-The higher group identification, the higher attitude of *khilafa-sharia* in individuals. Figure 1 below shows model of structural relationship between variables in *khilafa-sharia* establishment model that will be tested in this study.




Fig. 1. Structural model of attitude toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment in HTI, JAT, MMI

2.3. Research Instruments

The instruments/scales used in this study were tested for validity and reliability beforehand, so that it can describe the actual sample characteristics. Validity of scale is the accuracy of measuring instruments/scale, while reliability shows accuracy and stability of a scale in measuring something (Kerlinger, 2000). Validity and reliability of scale were obtained by testing procedure and confirmatory factor analysis. The test for 4 Likert scale that would be used in this study was conducted with 30 respondents who shared the same criteria with the real subjects of the research. Operational definition and scale of the variables in this study are as follows:

2.3.1. Endogen Variable

- Khilafa-sharia* establishment (KSE): Individual preference to agree or disagree in changing the system from democracy to *khilafa-sharia* in Indonesia, measured with *khalifa-sharia* establishment scale. Example: “the democratic system in Indonesia has to be changed to *khilafa-sharia* system.” This scale was developed after a process of elicitation, consisting of two items.
- Group identification (GI): The level of individual’s identification to group, measured with group identification scale, consisting of five items (Cadinu & Reggiori, 2002), for example: “Being a member of HTI/MMI/JAT influenced my lifestyle and way of thinking”; and loyalty to leader scale, for example: “I submit to and obey the rules and command of the leader of HTI/MMI/JAT”. This scale was developed after a process of elicitation, consisting of five items and one omitted item.
- Salafi* ideology (SI): The level of individuals’ belief in practicing Islam purely according to the teachings of the Prophet and the *salaf*, measured with *salafi* ideology scale that was developed after a process of elicitation, consisting of six items, for example: “I believe Islam will reign supreme if we live according to the teachings at the time of the Prophet and the *salaf*.”
- Daula* Islam ideology (DII): The level of individuals’ belief in the importance of the power and establishment of an Islamic state, measured with *daula* Islam ideology scale that was developed after a process of elicitation, consisting of four items, for example: “I believe in Islam as the religion (*din*) and state (*daula*), because power system is a very important key in Islam.”

2.3.2. Exogen Variable

- The need of uncertainty avoidance (NUA): The level of individuals’ need to avoid uncertain and ambiguous situation, measured with openness to experience scale from Big-Five (McCrae, 1996). Following Kenny’s (1979) and Jost et al.’s (2008) recommendation to pick three to four items per latent variable, we then chose four items, for example: “I like surprises and always looking for new activities to do”, measured with order scale from Big-Five, consisting of four items, for example: “I work according to my plan”, and measured with 4-items scale of intolerance to ambiguity (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1947).

b. The need of threat management (NTM): the level of individual's need to manage threat from the system and threat from the world as a dangerous place, measured with system threat scale that was developed after a process of elicitation, consisting of four items, for example: "The most dangerous thing for Muslims in Indonesia is democracy and the state system", and measured with dangerous world scale (Duckitt, 2001) consisting of eight items (three items omitted) for example: "Chaos and violence can happen around us anytime"

2.4. Research Subjects

Samples in this study were members and sympathizers of *Anshoru Tauhid* in Malang, Surabaya, Solo, Bima, and Jakarta; members and sympathizers of *Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia* in Yogyakarta, Solo, Sragen, Karanganyar and Sukoharjo; and members and sympathizers of *Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia* in Surabaya and Jakarta. Total number of research subjects who support the attitude toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment model were 384 people, with details as follows: 224 people (69.6 %) members of JAT, MMI and HTI, 22 people (6.8%) leaders of JAT, MMI and HTI, and 76 people (23.6%) sympathizers of JAT, MMI and HTI.

2.5. Procedures

Five hundred copies of questionnaire were distributed. To MMI, 150 copies were given out, 147 of it were returned completed and could be processed. To JAT, 150 copies were given out, 137 were completed. While to HTI, 200 copies were given out, 196 copies were returned but only 100 copies could be processed because 70 of it had the same exact answers and probably were filled in by one management staff in HTI Surabaya.

III. RESULTS

Results of confirmatory factor analysis showed that items developed to measure each variables could significantly measure the theoretical concept behind them. All items from all scales were valid, except item PDB3 from dangerous world perceptions scale and item IS3 from *salafi* ideology scale. Those two items were then omitted and excluded from further calculation. The results from confirmatory factor analysis model is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1. Results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis

Variable	Reliability	Validity	RMSEA	GVI	Conclusion
KSE	0.72	0.45	0.00	1.00	good fit
NUA	0.87	0.32-0.74	0.069	0.93	good fit
NTM	0.74	0.45-0.87	0.13	0.90	marginal fit
SI	0.78	0.50-0.79	0.00	0.97	good fit
DII	0.71	0.53-0.64	0.03	0.98	good fit
GI	0.77	0.32-0.83	0.041	0.92	good fit

KSE=khilafa-sharia establishment; NUA=need of uncertainty avoidance; NTM= need of threat management;


SI=salafi ideology; DII=daula Islam ideology; GI=group identification

While results of structural test showed that *khilafa-sharia* establishment model that was proposed as the hypothesis, fits, which means there's a match between the model and data on HTI, JAT and MMI, meeting the qualification of: $P\text{-value} \geq 0.05$, *Root Mean Square Error of Approximation* (RMSEA) ≤ 0.05 , *Goodness of fit index* (GFI) ≥ 0.90 and $T\text{-value} \geq 1.96$ (Byrne, 1998). So it can be said that attitude toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment was influenced by the need of uncertainty avoidance, need of threat management, through *salafi* ideologi, *daula* Islam ideology, and group identification.

TABLE 2. Good of fit attitude model toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment

Group	χ	df	RMSEA	CFI	P-value	Conclusion
HTI	34.41	28	0.048	0.99	0.19	Good Fit
JAT	36.86	28	0.048	0.96	0.12	Good Fit
MMI	35.11	28	0.042	0.98	0.17	Good Fit

All structural relations in *khilafa-sharia* establishment model that were proposed in this study were significant on $p \geq 0.05$. The summary of the relations are shown more clearly in figure 2, 3, 4 and 5.



KSE=khilafa-sharia establishment; NUA=need of uncertainty avoidance;
 NTM= need of threat management; SI=salafi ideology;
 DII=daula Islam ideology; GI=group identification Significant on **p0.01

Fig 2. Relationship strength of structural equation model in HTI, JAT and MMI




Fig 3. Relationship strength of structural equation model in HTI




Fig 4. Relationship strength of structural equation model in JAT




Fig 5. Relationship strength of structural equation model in MMI

Seeing the S_s coefficient, then in three group model (HTI, JAT and MMI together), the variable directly influencing attitude toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment was group identification variable with coefficient S_s 0.58. While in grouping model, HTI was with coefficient 0.28, JAT with coefficient 0.28, and MMI with coefficient 0.61.

Variable coefficient with the strongest influence to the three group model was *daula* Islam ideology toward group identification, with S_s coefficient 0.83. While in group model, variable coefficient with the strongest influence in HTI was the need of uncertainty avoidance variable toward *salafi* ideology with coefficient 0.85; in JAT the strongest influence was *salafi* ideology variable toward *daula* Islam ideology with coefficient 0.79; and in MMI it was *daula* Islam ideology variable toward group identification with coefficient 0.89.

Another strong influence was *salafi* ideology variable toward *daula* Islam ideology, with S_s coefficient 0.73. While in group model, the variable with a strong influence in HTI was the need of threat management variable toward *daula* Islam ideology with coefficient 0.70; in JAT, it was the need of uncertainty avoidance variable toward *salafi* ideology with coefficient 0.65; and in MMI it was the need of threat management variable toward *daula* Islam ideology with coefficient 0.71.

In three groups together model, the variable with the weakest influence but significant was the need of threat management toward *daula* Islam ideology, with S_s coefficient 0.16. The need of uncertainty avoidance also didn't have a strong influence toward *salafi* ideology with coefficient S_s 0.23. This was different with the single group model, where in HTI the variable with the weakest influence was *salafi* ideology variable toward *daula* Islam, with coefficient 0.27, also group identification variable, that had a weak influence toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment with coefficient 0.28. In JAT, the variables with weakest influence were the need of uncertainty avoidance variable toward *daula* Islam ideology, with coefficient 0.27, and group identification variable toward attitude to *khilafa-sharia* establishment variable, with coefficient 0.28. While in MMI, variable with the weakest influence was *salafi* ideology variable toward *daula* Islam ideology, with coefficient 0.34.

Hypothesis testing was conducted to determine whether the hypothesis proposed in this study is accepted or rejected. The statistical significance in this study, by using t-statistic on significance level 0.05, then t-statistic (t-value) needed is $\geq \pm 1.96$. As shown in Table 3, based on the t-value then all the hypotheses were accepted, which means all variables significantly influenced the other variables.

TABLE 3. Hypotheses test results

Variable relations	T-value		
	HTI	JAT	MMI
NUA and SI	8.54	5.99	7.39
NTM and DII	3.30	2.09	5.92
SI and DII	1.37	5.80	3.30
DII and GI	8.79	3.21	4.58
GI and KSE	6.53	2.51	4.25

t table $\geq \pm 1.96$ on significance level 0.05

IV. DISCUSSION

The results show support to psychological needs model from attitudes toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment in Indonesia, both in three groups together or in each group. This finding is theoretically important, because the results are a critique toward system justification theory (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Political attitude to change the status quo appears not because of political ideology (liberal-conservative), but due to strong psychological needs, Islamic political ideologies, and group identification.

This study reveals that the need of uncertainty avoidance and the need of threat management are psychological forces underlying ideology and political behaviors (Josh et al., 2003a). The dichotomy about muslims-infidels along with the view of Islam as absolutely right, and anything other than Islam as absolutely wrong, show a high tendency in individuals to have certainty and stability in their social life (Van den Bos, 2009). A high need of uncertainty avoidance drives them to purify Islam and live in the way of life of the past.

Individuals who have this need will hold *salafi* ideology, which is the belief to purify the religion and live according to the ways of the *salaf*. They want to practice Islam as perfectly as the Prophet Muhammad's teachings. Psychologically, it can be explained that when individuals or groups think about situations that make them uncertain, they will obey the cultural norms and values (Van den Bos et.al., 2005). This is because the view to live in Islamic ways as the original teachings of the Prophet serves to provide certainty and stability.

While the need of threat management stems from secular-democracy system which separates religion from state, and this secular ideology threatens the purity of Islam. The current condition of the world and secular ways of living are seen as a threat toward the purity of the teachings of Prophet Muhammad (Sageman, 2004).

Norms, beliefs and symbols of secular-democracy are forbidden systems which threatens pure Islamic teachings, contrary to Islamic values and identity, and cause fear that secular culture will get rid of Islamic way of life.

Secular-democracy threatens the religion, values, belief system, ideology, philosophy, morality or worldview of muslims. The ideal about practicing Islam in a perfect and pure way as in the time of *salaf* can only be achieved within *daula* Islam. The need of threat management drives individuals and groups to hold *daula* Islam ideology, which is the belief about the importance of establishing *daula* Islam in regulating Islamic society. This study also support “the uncertainty paradox” (Haas & Cunningham, 2014), when individual or group feel save, uncertainty leads to greater tolerance, yet when threatened, uncertainty leads to reduce tolerance.

For political Islamic groups, what matters for muslims is only *khilafa* (Islamic power). Purifying the religion and re-managing individual behaviors and the muslim community have to be based on Islam (Frey, 2007), by applying *sharia* in all aspects of life with force. This can only be achieved by having control on political powers (An-Naim, 2003). Each muslim has the obligation to participate in developing *khilafa* and *sharia* through relatively homogeneous group, an entity that is based on commitment to faith and *salafi* ideology system and *daula* Islam (see Hogg, 2004).

This phenomenon of change initiated by the right-wing is called as “conservative paradox” by Jost et. al. (2003b), which is changes in current time by taking idealism of the past. Because according to system justification theory (Jost & Hunyady, 2002), individuals with conservative ideology will reject changes. This idea by Jost was rejected by Greendberg and Jonas (2003), who argued that even if they idealize the past, they still encourage change. The attitude of political Islamic groups in Indonesia in changing the democracy system to *khilafa-sharia* is their reaction that is based on certain religious interpretations, by taking visions of the past to strengthen the present and build the future.

V. CONCLUSION

A high need of uncertainty avoidance influences the level of *salafi* ideology. While perceived threats toward religious beliefs drive groups to hold *daula* Islam ideology. Strong *daula* Islam ideology eventually becomes the group identity, which strengthens identification toward political Islamic groups and therefore strengthens their commitment to achieve their goal, which is to replace democracy in Indonesia with *khilafa* and *sharia*. These groups want to return to muslim glory by going back to Islamic teachings, which means that all the aspects of social, economic, and political life are based exclusively on Islam using the *khilafa* and *sharia* system. Islam’s glory can be achieved by returning to the original doctrines of the Prophet. The roles of political Islamic ideologies that are driven by a high need of uncertainty avoidance and threat management through group identification to attitude toward *khilafa-sharia* establishment are discussed.

Based on the results of this study, we learn that political Islamic groups have a high need of uncertainty avoidance and threat management. These two needs are fulfilled by *salafi* ideology and *daula* Islam ideology, that are disseminated in the group and strengthen the identification to Islamic groups. The results of this study give two practical and theoretical suggestions. For the practical suggestion, considering that the roles of the group and the leaders are very important, then to deal with the problem of *khilafa-sharia* establishment attitude, it is suggested to address it at the group level. Changing this attitude is not a simple task, taking into account that behind the attitude there are very strong psychological needs and Islamic political ideologies. But it can still be done through communication, discussions or debates using the language of the Quran and *hadith* between leaders/*ulema* who support *sharia* and leaders/*ulema* who support democracy. The results of the discussions should be widely disseminated to society. Even if these discussions cannot change their ideology, this needs to be considered, like the discussions between Sunni and Shia muslims that have already been made into a book. For theoretical suggestion, we suggest to test the model using a wider sample, be it from other *khilafa-sharia* supporter groups or mainstream muslim groups.

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